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Toward Pragmatically Naturalized
Transcendental Philosophy of Scientic Inquiry
And Pragmatic Scientic Realism
Sami Pihlström
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
University of Jyväskylä
is paper seeks to show that the turn toward local scientic practices in the phi-
losophy of science is not a turn away from transcendental investigations. On the
contrary, a pragmatist approach can very well be (re)connected with Kantian tran-
scendental examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of scientic
representation and cognition, insofar as the a priori conditions that transcenden-
tal philosophy of science examines are understood as historically relative and thus
potentially changing. e issue of scientic realism will be considered from this
perspective, with special emphasis onomas Kuhn’s conception of paradigms as
frameworks making truth-valued scientic statements possible and on Charles S.
Peirce’s realism about “real generals”.
Keywords: realism, naturalism, pragmatism, scientic realism, transcendental phi-
losophy, Kuhn
1. Introduction
Philosophy of science has over the past couple of decades—following suc-
cessful interdisciplinary inquiries in science and technology studies, in par-
ticular—taken the concrete local practices of historically contextualized sci-
entic inquiry much more seriously than more traditional philosophies of
science, such as logical empiricism and its follow-ups, including standard
versions of scientic realism and neo-Kantian social constructivism, ever
did. Attempts to understand the nature of science have thus shied from
“global” questions of justication, for example concerns with the logical
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structure of scientic theories, scientic inference, and scientic explana-
tion—concerns arguably culminating in whatmay be regarded as “transcen-
dental” issues concerning the very possibility of cognitive experience or sci-
entic knowledge and representation—to more “local” issues of, say, mod-
eling and other epistemic activities whose central cognitive goals and strate-
gies are strongly practice-embedded and even unintelligible without a prac-
tical context.
is shi, though understandably resisted by traditional philosophers
of science fearing the excesses of relativism, is in many ways a welcome one.
However, it is very important to realize that the shi from the global to the
local is not inevitably a move to a completely non-transcendental approach
to science. By developing this point I will, in the following, also argue, at
a more general level, for the compatibility and even the mutually enriching
potential of the pragmatic and the transcendental perspectives on science.
2. e pragmatic and the transcendental
I want to begin by arguing that taking local scientic practices seriously does
not automatically mean that one is a resolutely non-Kantian philosopher
in one’s account of scientic inquiry. is is because the Kantian or quasi-
Kantian “transcendental” element—whatever it is that must be presupposed
for inquiry, representation, or cognition to be possible—may lie in the local
practices themselves.1 is is an insight that may be developed through a
Kantian reading ofomas Kuhn’s work, in particular. Kuhn, aer all, was
a major gure—perhaps the most important gure—behind the “practice
turn” of contemporary philosophy of science and science and technology
studies. (Cf. Kuhn 1970, 2000; see also Pihlström and Siitonen 2005)
According to Kuhn’s well-known statement, the notion of truth, insofar
as it has anything to do with the developments of science and scientic the-
ories, cannot be “extra-theoretical” correspondence but must instead be un-
derstood “intra-theoretically” (Kuhn 2000, 115, 160–162, 251).is does not
mean any naïve anti-realism or constructivism, however.ere is a sense in
which the world is “experientially given” and “solid”, instead of being some-
thing that we (or the scientists) simply “make up” (Kuhn 2000, 101). Even
in Kuhn’s late work, there is, nevertheless, a version of the famous idea of
1 Generally, Kantian transcendental philosophy—following Kant’s (1781/1787) discussion of
the necessary conditions for the possibility of cognitive experience—engages in inquiries
into necessary conditions for the possibility of certain given human actualities, such as (in
addition to experience, Kant’s main concern) linguistic meaning (Wittgenstein) or scien-
tic representation. It is always controversial to read later thinkers as “Kantian” or “tran-
scendental”; my suggestions in this regard must therefore be regarded as provisional and
suggestive rather than aiming at historical accuracy.
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dierent paradigms constituting “dierent worlds” (cf. Kuhn 1970, 111, 206):
he does speak about the “world-constitutive” role of human intentionality
and mental representations (Kuhn 2000, 103). e world is in some sense
constituted or structured, if not literally constructed, by the human mind—
or, more specically, by scientic theorization and other epistemic activities,
both srictly scientic and more loosely everyday ones.
In this way, Kuhn does seem to argue, early and late, that local scientic
practices are in the business of world-constitution. Indeed, the plausibil-
ity of the Kuhnian view of the world-constitutivity of paradigms and intra-
theoretical truth seems to depend on the availability of a Kantian interpre-
tation and/or reconstruction of Kuhn’s occasionally more than just mildly
obscure statements. Kuhn himself admitted in his late work that he had de-
veloped “a sort of post-Darwinian Kantianism”, with “the lexicon” supplying
“preconditions of possible experience” in a way analogous to the Kantian
categories, yet diering from the latter by being relative to both time and
community (Kuhn 2000, 104). Kuhn should, then, be read as a Kantian with
“movable categories” (Kuhn 2000, 264) and without any permanently exist-
ing things in themselves (see Kuhn 2000, 207); his “structured lexicon” and
Kant’s “a priori” may both, in a relativized sense, be taken to be “constitutive
of possible experience of the world” without assuming that they could dictate
what that experience must be in any concrete case (Kuhn 2000, 245).
Yet, again, something analogous to the Kantian thing in itself must be
at work even in Kuhn’s system, because “something permanent, xed, and
stable” must be what underlies the changes of lexical categories (Kuhn 2000,
104); anomalies requiring readjustments in scientic theories and paradigms
could hardly occur at all, if everything there is were simply dependent on or
constructed by us.ere is, then, a curious combination of realism and ide-
alism (constructivism) to be found in Kuhn—at least as profoundly as there
is such a combination in Kant himself, who famously sought to integrate
transcendental idealism with empirical realism and to avoid both dogmatic
transcendental realism and skeptical empirical idealism. While the Kuhnian
philosopher of science clearly need not employ this Kantian terminology,
something like a Kantian vocabulary does seem to be required tomake sense
of the basic idea of the world being both (“transcendentally”) dependent on
scientic practices and (“empirically”) independent of them; without a Kan-
tian background this hardly makes sense at all.2
2 For more comprehensive discussions of Kuhn’s relation to realism, constructivism, and
Kantianism, see, e.g., (Hoyningen-Huene 1993), (Andersen 2001), (Friedman 2001, 2002,
2003), and (Sharrock and Read 2002). Nothing in my elaborations in this paper depends
on getting Kuhn historically right; in particular, I do not want to take any nal stand on
the question of whether Kuhn oers novel ideas in the realism debate or leads us out of
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Hence, we can now reach a conditional conclusion: if we want to make
sense of Kuhn’s view, that the way the world is, is paradigm-relative (cap-
tured in the slogan that “the world changes” in a scientic revolution), or
the related view that local practices of inquiry play a constitutive role in
the emergence of scientic truths, facts, and objects, we should understand
the relevant notions of paradigm-relativity and constitutivity in a (quasi-
)Kantian transcendental sense, analogously to the way in which the objects
of possible experience are, according to Kant himself, constituted by the cat-
egories (that is, the pure concepts of the understanding) and the forms of
intuition.
3. Kuhn and pragmatism
A key observation at this point is that the kind of Kantian reading of Kuhn
sketched in the previous section is not inevitably non-pragmatist. We may,
in a broad sense, understand both Kuhn’s account of scientic paradigms
and the more general practice-oriented conception of science in contem-
porary philosophy of science and science and technology studies as “prag-
matist”. However, pragmatism can be a transcendental approach, too, as
soon as we realize that the contextually necessary transcendental conditions
for the possibility of cognitive experience (or, better, scientic representa-
tion of objective reality) are themselves practice-laden and historically re-
visable. While the classical pragmatists—Charles S. Peirce, William James,
John Dewey, and others—were oen highly critical of Kant (just think of
James’s pronouncement that the path of philosophical progress should be
seen asmoving from theBritish empiricists “roundKant”, instead of “through
Kant”, to pragmatism), this is inmy viewpartly based on their possibly some-
what limited self-understanding, as well as their limited understanding of
what has proven to be most important and sustainable in Kantian philoso-
phy (see, e.g., Pihlström 2003, 2008, 2009).
No obvious historical lines of inuence can be traced from the classi-
cal pragmatists to Kuhn. However, Kuhn can, arguably, be interpreted—and
has been interpreted byMichael Friedman and others—as joining, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, if not those older pragmatists’ views, at least the quasi-
pragmatist ideas later made famous by thinkers like Ludwig Wittgenstein
and C.I. Lewis (as well as, possibly, Michel Foucault) concerning the histori-
cally relative “a priori”. Kuhnian paradigms (or lexicons) play this reconcep-
tualized a priori role as enabling (making possible) scientic representation,
and thereby also enabling scientic objects and truths to emerge from scien-
tic practices and theorizing. Kuhn’s position can, by synthesizing Kantian
that debate.
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and pragmatist insights, be generalized into a more comprehensive version
of historicized and naturalized (“pragmatized”) transcendental idealism and
transcendental philosophy of science. (Cf. Pihlström 2003, 2004; Pihlström
and Siitonen 2005) Pragmatists more generally should be read as Kantian
philosophers in the sense that they also challenged and continue to chal-
lenge transcendental realism, the supposition that the world possesses its
“own” categorial ontological structure that our schemes and theories, or our
science, can be expected to “cut at its joints”, i.e., to simply reveal (or to fall
short of revealing) “as it is in itself ” and that could at least in principle be
accurately represented in an absolute theory (and cannot be so represented
if we lack an absolute theory).3
It is extremely important to give up the apodicticity, unrevisability, and
universality of Kantian transcendental principles, in order to re-entangle
Kantianism and pragmatism in a way that preserves the constitutive func-
tion of those principles. As Friedman (2001, 30) explains, these principles
need not be unrevisable in order to remain “constitutive of the concept of the
object of knowledge.” One of the most important versions of this “relative
a priori” is Lewis’s (1923) theory of the “pragmatic a priori” (cf. Järvilehto
2011). Its relations to Kuhn’s ideas would deserve closer historical and sys-
tematic scrutiny.
However, this is not the right place to continue scholarly debates onwhat
pragmatism actually means, either historically or systematically (see, e.g.,
Pihlström 2011c); nor am I in this paper willing to return to the question
of how exactly to write the history of pragmatist philosophy of science—
assuming that there even is such a history to be coherently written (cf.
Pihlström 2008). Clearly, it is not necessary to adopt the concept of prag-
matism at all in one’s interpretations of either Kuhn or the practice-oriented
philosophy of science more generally. Perhaps the label “pragmatism” in
the end adds very little to the key idea of focusing on scientic practices.
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the ways in which the realism debate,
in particular, have been continued in the pragmatist tradition—and carried
on and transformed into a pragmatic shape from the Kantian transcendental
tradition—oer illuminating comparisons to Kuhn andmany post-Kuhnian
philosophers of science who have taken the “practice turn”.
Joseph Rouse (2003) is one of the interpreters of Kuhn insightfully draw-
ing due attention to Kuhn’s role in emphasizing science as a practice. Rouse
takes this to mean that Kuhn rejected the traditional epistemological ques-
tions of justifying scientic beliefs. However, while it is certainly correct
3 emodern version of this view, already rejected byKant, would be “metaphysical realism”,
rmly rejected by Hilary Putnam and his many followers in the contemporary realism
debate. See, e.g., (Putnam 1981, 1990).
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to note that the traditional issue of epistemic justication is not central in
Kuhn, this seems to presuppose an unpragmatic dichotomy between prac-
tices and beliefs, whereas the more obviously pragmatist response to the
traditional questions of justication would be the insistence that beliefs are
practices—or, as the classical pragmatists themselves oen put it, “habits of
action”. e view that beliefs are habits of action is one of the fundamental
ideas of pragmatism all the way from the initiation of the pragmatist tradi-
tion by Charles S. Peirce and William James: beliefs are something on the
basis of which we are prepared to act.us, it is somewhat problematic that,
aer perceptively pointing out that Kuhn leads us to a shi toward a descrip-
tion of science as an activity (rather than as a product of an activity), Rouse
continues to claim that paradigms ought to be understood as “exemplary
ways of conceptualizing and intervening in particular situations”, instead of
being understood “as beliefs (even tacit beliefs) agreed upon by community
members” (Rouse 2003, 107).
From a pragmatist point of view, we may and should say that it is pre-
cisely in virtue of their being “ways of conceptualizing and intervening” that
paradigms are also beliefs, or networks of beliefs—or perhaps “webs of be-
liefs”, to employ a Quinean phrase (cf. section 4 below). It is in our goal-
directed activities and practices themselves that our ontological ways of tak-
ing the world to be in some particular manner are to be located. ere are,
and can be, no beliefs at all apart from such activities and practices. Beliefs
are inevitably based on practical contexts of inquiry, as the very purpose of
inquiry is the xation of belief, or the settlement of a problematic situation,
and what this pragmatically involves is the acquisition of a new habit, or a
revision of an already established one. Rouse’s dichotomies between “practi-
tioners” and “believers” and between “beliefs and forms of life” (Rouse 2003,
109, 112) are, then, simply too unpragmatistic to be helpful in the context
of my “transcendentally pragmatist” re-reading of Kuhn (and Kuhnian phi-
losophy of science generally). Scientists, pragmatically speaking, are both
practitioners and (hence) “believers”.4
4 Accordingly, while Rouse’s reections are generally very helpful in integrating (pragmatic)
naturalism with irreducible normativity within scientic practices (see also Rouse 2002),
he oers no adequate historical treatment of pragmatism (which, of course, is not to say
that he would have to do so. . . ). As a matter of fact, I suggested already some time ago
(see Pihlström 1998, chapter 9) that Rouse’s earlier (Rouse 1996) proposals for a “post-
modernist” philosophy of scientic practice could at least in part be cashed out in terms
of (Deweyan) pragmatism. See also (Pihlström 2008).
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4. Pragmatismasnaturalized transcendental philosophy: holism
and interdisciplinarity
Pragmatism can, then, be rearticulated as a form of naturalized transcen-
dental philosophy, both generally and in the context of contemporary phi-
losophy of science, in particular. (And Kuhn himself, arguably, was a kind
of pragmatist in this sense.) A further interesting analogy, drawn more di-
rectly from within the pragmatist tradition, could also be suggested here:
Morton White’s (1956, 1986, 2002) holistic pragmatism can be seen as a ver-
sion of the kind of pragmatically naturalized and historicized transcendental
philosophy of science that the “local practices” approach in the philosophy
of science today could utilize (althoughWhite himself might not be entirely
satised with this characterization). Historical and systematic comparisons
between Kuhn and White should be encouraged; very little work has so far
been done in this regard. Kuhnian paradigms could be seen as practice-
embedded sets of factual and normative assumptions governing inquiry in
a given discipline or eld, along the lines of White’s holistic pragmatism.
Irreducible normativity, which is crucial for scientic practices to be ratio-
nally constrained, is to be found within paradigms themselves, not external
to them.
White agreed with W.V. Quine already in the late 1940s and early 1950s
that there is no sharp, essentialist dichotomy to be drawn between analytic
and synthetic statements (seeWhite 1956). However, he extended this holism
to cover the relation between factual and normative statements, which—in
contrast to Quine—he also saw as entangled (White 1986); ultimately, this
leads to a comprehensive holistic philosophy of culture in which science as
well as ethics, law, and history, among other elds of inquiry, are seen as
constituting a single overarching “web” (White 2002; cf. Pihlström 2011a).
is is a web of beliefs as much as a web of practices and activities of inquiry,
going very well together with the classical pragmatists’ broad notion of in-
quiry, which covers not only science as conventionally understood but also
ethics, politics, and even religion.
Moreover, such “webs” are historically developing entities, also in a way
comparable to traditions, which clearly brings them close to Kuhnian para-
digms. It is only within such a context—a paradigm, a web, a network—that
something can count as a belief that could have a truth-value, as a way the
world can be taken to be. So, we are here dealing with a transcendental issue
again. e ways in which we are intentionally, experientially, and represen-
tationally connected with the world we inquire into through our webs of be-
liefs and practices are ultimately transcendental. ey enable us to engage
in our cognitive endeavors, both scientic and everyday ones. e world is
never just “given” to us independently of such practice-laden, normatively
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constrained engagements. e webs of beliefs we may act upon are frame-
works in terms of which the world can be scientically represented.
e concept of interdisciplinary inquiry is particularly crucial here. One
might even argue that White’s holistic pragmatism itself is not just a philo-
sophical but an inherently interdisciplinary approach to inquiry. e sci-
ences and the humanities, in particular, are parts of the same holistic web
of rational inquiry into the world we live in, just like science and ethics are.
A holistic pragmatist conception of interdisciplinarity should be able to in-
tegrate naturalism (or the legitimate emphasis on the natural sciences and
their signicant achievements) with something like humanistic “construc-
tivism” (human self-interpretation and self-transformation) into a single,
yet pragmatically pluralistic and open-ended, image of our rational inquiries
into the nature of things, ourselves included. If, when engaging in such in-
quiries, one is literally surrounded by colleagues representing dierent dis-
ciplines, one may also be better equipped to understand one’s own inquiry
as interdisciplinary; one may even cease to view oneself (or others) as a rep-
resentative of a single discipline and rearticulate one’s own position in the
eld of inquiry as irreducibly interdisciplinary.
I am not here pretending to know exactly what interdisciplinarity is, or
how it should be dened. One key aspect of the pragmatist and fallibilist
rejection of “rst philosophy” (following Quine and White, as well as Kuhn
and other practice-oriented philosophers of science) is, in any event, the
acknowledgment of the need for deepening interdisciplinarity—not only
multidisciplinarity—in our inquiries into the world and ourselves, includ-
ing our inquiries into what scientic inquiries themselves are and should be
like. One reason why holistic pragmatism is an inherently interdisciplinary
approach in these inquiries (as I suggested above) is that pragmatists ought
to oppose all dichotomies and boundaries that may “block the road of in-
quiry” (quoting Peirce’s famous words). Traditional disciplinary boundaries
may be such blocks. ey may, by blocking the road of inquiry, even block
the emergence of certain kinds of scientic facts or objects that (only) an
interdisciplinary paradigm makes possible.
Of course, in practice there may be cases in which it is dicult to de-
termine what exactly interdisciplinarity should mean and how it ought to
be promoted in practices of inquiry, or academic institutions. For exam-
ple, in interdisciplinary research institutions, in practice at least three al-
ternative “readings” of the requirement to promote interdisciplinarity, sig-
nicantly varying in strength, might be implemented. (i) Each individual
scholar and/or research project might be required to be internally interdis-
ciplinary (though possibly there can be degrees in the strength of their in-
terdisciplinarity). us, no scholar or research project should, according
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to this formulation, represent just a single academic discipline but would
have to represent at least two (or, perhaps preferably, more). (ii) According
to a somewhat weaker interpretation, an individual scholar and/or project
could represent just one discipline, but they would have to be open to in-
terdisciplinary relations to other disciplines. ere would thus have to be
interdisciplinary potential in a research proposal, even though it would not
have to be internally interdisciplinary. (iii) Only the interdisciplinary re-
search institution as a whole would, according to the weakest interpretation,
be required to be truly interdisciplinary.is would allow individual schol-
ars and/or their projects to be even relatively strictly “disciplinary”, but their
combination would be expected to be such that (perhaps unexpected) inter-
disciplinary cooperation might grow out of it. (I am not saying, of course,
that these three options exhaust all the alternative formulations of interdis-
ciplinarity.)
Now, how should the correct strength of the interdisciplinarity expec-
tation (either in the case of an individual or in the case of a community
of scholars) be determined? Does pragmatism, e.g., White’s holistic prag-
matism or Kuhnian practice-oriented philosophy of science, help us in this
regard? ere is no immediate answer to the question of how strong in-
terdisciplinarity pragmatism should promote. On the contrary, this is it-
self a contextually pragmatic matter, to be determined through a holistic
critical consideration of the practices in question, in relation to other prac-
tices forming our cultural “web”, as well as the purposes of the inquiry we
are engaging in. e pragmatic value of interdisciplinarity should, more-
over, always be relativized to the aims and goals of the particular inquiry
(or practice) thus contextually and holistically considered. An obvious ex-
ample of philosophical interdisciplinarity is the debate over naturalism—a
debate to which pragmatists since Dewey have made major contributions
and to which Rouse (2002) oers one of the most balanced reactions in the
contemporary discussion—which cannot be settled independently of a vast
variety of other philosophical and metaphilosophical issues, ethical and po-
litical ones included.
At this point of our discussion, it goes without saying that wide-ranging
philosophical issues such as naturalism and interdisciplinarity are, in my
view, also “transcendental” issues in the reinterpreted pragmatic sense expli-
cated above. ey are in the end issues concerning our being able to mean-
ingfully represent reality. Furthermore, it has sometimes been suggested
that, far from there being a sharp separation between the humanities and
the natural sciences, all sciences are actually “human sciences”. Natural sci-
ences like physics are themselves oriented to theworld on the basis of human
interests and needs.ese are not “nature’s own” perspectives—recall again
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not just Kuhn but Kant and the classical pragmatists, too—but, inescapably,
human ones.ey are, as much as the traditional humanities, expressions of
human self-interpretation.is is also something that pragmatists attracted
by White’s holistic pragmatism could and should spell out in more philo-
sophical detail, while including philosophy—as well as metaphilosophy—
itself in the practice-embedded web of beliefs to be holistically tested. Sci-
ence is part of human culture, and when critically examining the normative
structures of academic practices of inquiry, we already operate within holis-
tic pragmatism, ultimately evaluating the “unied whole” of human culture
more generally, i.e., our ways of being in the world and categorizing and
inquiring into the world in and through the cultural practices we have de-
veloped and are continuously developing.5
5. Scientic realism?
At least one major philosophical question remains to be considered: scien-
tic realism. As I have suggested above, pragmatism can, generally, be un-
derstood as synthesizing something like transcendental idealism (in its nat-
uralized and historicized, thus contextually relativized, reincarnation) with
empirical realism. is is a further indication of its deep commitment to a
Kantian approach in the project of conceptualizing our cognitive and repre-
sentational relations to reality. It should, thus, be easy to appreciate both the
Kantian and the pragmatist aspects of not only Kuhn’s conception of science
but also, say, Putnam’s internal realism (cf. Putnam 1981, 1990).
In the realism debate, there is, of course, a wide variety of dierent views
to consider—almost all of which must simply be ignored here. For instance,
how exactly the pragmatist andKantian elements ofwhat I have called “prag-
matic realism” (cf., e.g., Pihlström2008)might be incorporated in the slightly
dierent position known as “practical realism” (Vihalemm 2011) remains to
be discussed elsewhere. I suppose that Rein Vihalemm’s practical realism
diers frommy approach in being more distant from the Kantian transcen-
dental concerns—and therefore in a sense “more realistic” (and at least not
idealistic even in a reinterpreted sense). Yet, it seems to me that a very basic
transcendental issue concerning the practice-laden representability and ex-
perienceability of reality must be taken up from the perspective of practical
realism, too: according to Vihalemm’s practical realist, scientic objects can,
aer all, only be identied within scientic practices.us, it would seem—
at least this rearticulation should be available to the “Kantian pragmatist”—
that practices provide transcendental (contextual) conditions for the possi-
5 is interpretation and elaboration of White’s holistic pragmatism is more comprehen-
sively developed in (Pihlström 2011a).
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bility of there being scientically representable objects at all—for us. is
also sounds very much like Dewey’s (e.g., 1929) view that scientic objects
are not “ready-made” prior to inquiry but rather arise out of, or are con-
structed and/or identied in the course of, inquiry.
In addition, itmust be observed that the problem framework of scientic
realism raises issues not just concerning the traditional opposition between
realism and idealism (today reconceived as the debate between realism and
constructivism) but also concerning the ones between realism and relativism
(compare the discussion of the “relativized a priori” above in section 3) and
even realism and nominalism. I have commented on these issues, also in rela-
tion to the philosophy of science and its history—with the particular goal of
understanding better the development of pragmatist philosophy of science
in the twentieth century—on a number of earlier occasions (e.g., Pihlström
2008, 2011b), so I will be very brief and selective here.
In the case of the realism vs. nominalism dispute, which might seem
to be relatively far removed from the central issues in contemporary phi-
losophy of science (it sounds more than slightly medieval, does not it?),
the crucial question for a pragmatic realist and transcendental pragmatist
is this: is there a viable analogy of (pragmatic) transcendental idealism and
empirical realism when it comes to the special issue of realism about uni-
versals (or what Peirce called “real generals”, e.g., laws and habits)6 and/or
modalities, both of which are crucially important in an adequate conception
of scientic inquiry as an inquiry into something “real”? In previous works
(Pihlström2003, 2009), I have oered a pragmatic-constructivist (albeit nat-
uralized transcendental) account of Peircean “real generals”, acknowledging
their reality but interpreting this reality only in a practice- and discourse-
internal sense—that is, as something ultimately humanly “constructed” (cf.
also, e.g., Margolis 2010). e key idea here is that real generals, such as
natural laws and dispositions, must be postulated in order to make sense of
the scientic pursuit of truth, including truth about general laws and reg-
ularities, but this is nevertheless our human way of making sense of—or
inquiring into what we nd necessary conditions for the possibility of—our
practices of inquiry.
Now, while something like this is certainly a philosophical view of real
generals tting “local” practice-oriented philosophy of science and science
and technology studies—a realism about real generals that is analogous to
“mere” empirical realism and therefore well compatible with transcenden-
tal idealism or constructivism (pragmatism)—we must still pause to reect
6 For more details, see Peirce’s early and late writings on “real generals”—all the way from
the late 1860s to 1905–1907—collected in (Peirce 1992–1998). For references to relevant
scholarship, see also (Pihlström 2009, chapter 6).
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on whether the position we have arrived at is plausible or even coherent.
Stronger Peircean realistsmay argue that pragmatism itself, given itsmethod
of focusing on the “conceivable practical eects” of our ideas, concepts, con-
ceptions, and theories,7 presupposes in a more full-blown sense the basic
commitments of what Peirce called “extreme scholastic realism”, i.e., realism
about generality, including modalities. is is, arguably, because a realistic
interpretation of possibility, in particular, is needed in order to account for
“conceivable practical eects”. e conceivable eects our ideas may have
include eects never concretely realized in actuality.
is sounds heavily metaphysical but is in fact a vital issue for pragma-
tist philosophy of science, too, not just for pragmatist metaphysics. Are, for
instance, physical or chemical laws and other structures Peircean-like “real
generals”? If so, is it plausible to claim that they are still somehow tran-
scendentally dependent on our inquiry, in a (pragmatically reinterpreted)
Kantian-like sense? Are natural laws, in particular, nomically necessary in
a realistic sense; are they also “real generals”? And even if they are, are not
they also metaphysically (as well as, of course, logically) contingent, as the
law-like structure of the world could presumably have been very dierent
from what it de facto is? What is, furthermore, the relation between scien-
tic representations (contextualized in our inquiries) and the laws that are
from the point of view of our scientic theories claimed to “really” obtain in
the world?
ese issues remain open here; in any event, my general proposal is that
real generals can and should be regarded not as features of the world an
sich—anymore than our theories or representations can ever be about things
in themselves, either according to Kant or according to Kuhn—but as fea-
tures of the-world-as-seen-through-the-practices-of-inquiry (whatever that
ultimately concretely means). For example, physical or chemical structures
could be seen as both real (that is, as real generals independent of our repre-
sentations in an empirical sense) and as constructed (that is, as practice- or
paradigm-relative, or at least identiable onlywithin practices or paradigms,
in the pragmatically naturalized transcendental sense). More work clearly
needs to be done here.
One way of pragmatically “cashing out” the idea that what there is de-
pends on our epistemic and representational activities and practices of in-
quiry—or, in Kuhnian terms, on our paradigms—and the related idea of in-
7 is is not the proper place to inquire into the meaning of the pragmatic method or prag-
matic maxim, rst formulated by Peirce in his 1878 essay, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”
(reprinted in Peirce 1992–1998, vol. 1), and later employed by James, among others (see es-
pecially James 1907, chapter 2). For an updated discussion, see the relevant contributions
to (Pihlström 2011c).
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tegrating transcendental idealism (constructivism) with empirical realism,
through pragmatism, is what I have elsewhere called the “contextualization
of scheme-(in)dependence” (see Pihlström2011b).e basic idea here is that
nothing is scheme- or practice- (or paradigm-) dependent or -independent
as such, “in itself ”, but only in one or another context of practice-driven in-
quiry. Hence, the contextuality and relativity of a priori principles (cf. sec-
tion 3 above) is in a way taken to the meta-level of philosophical interpreta-
tions of transcendental philosophy and the notions of scheme- or practice-
dependence and scheme-independence themselves.
Even so, the question concerning realism about generality, particularly
about real possibilities and other modalities, must be le unresolved here.
Philosophers of science oen nd it necessary to invoke irreducibly modal
notions in order to make sense of the idea that the world could be, or could
have been, structured in terms of quite dierent practice-embedded theories
and paradigms than the ones we actually have at our disposal.8 Somehow
modalities must already be incorporated in practices themselves, so it is not
enough to simply say that a (moderately) realistic interpretation of modal-
ities is just based on our practices. Aer all, practices are contexts within
which things can be done in certain ways—or occasionally le undone—
and this clearly means that they are, in Peircean terms, “generals”. So are
Kuhn’s paradigms. So are any contexts that can play the transcendental role
of pragmatically enabling scientic representation of objects, in the sense
outlined in the early sections of this paper.
6. Conclusion
e relevance of all this relatively abstract and general discussion to both the
interdisciplinary eld of science and technology studies (or other practice-
oriented reections on the nature of science) and to special elds within the
philosophy of science, e.g., the philosophy of chemistry, of biology, or of the
social sciences, must remain implicit. However, the general issue of realism
and the questions concerning the pragmatic naturalizability of transcenden-
tal approaches to that issue could presumably easily be illustrated in terms
of more specic problems drawn from current discussions in these elds.
8 For example, RomHarré’s suggestion that the world, “prior to” conceptualization andmea-
surement (or the application of an apparatus of investigation), is somehow a world of “af-
fordances”, potentialities, or powers, comes close to a view admitting Peircean real gen-
erals. However, Harré emphasizes that these potentialities are not exactly “in” the world
itself prior to its being subjected to an investigation involving our apparatuses; they are
properties of “the world plus the apparatus”.is makes his view clearly pragmatic (yet, in
my view, also transcendental). I am indebted to many discussions at the Tartu workshop
for being able to appreciate these connections.
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Pragmatism, I have tried to argue in this paper (and in some more de-
tail, albeit in somewhat dierent contexts, in several previous publications),
is a highly promising philosophical (and metaphilosophical) perspective in
these inquiries, but it needs both updating in terms of interdisciplinary, “lo-
calized” investigations of scientic practices (e.g., from the perspective of
science and technology studies as a “successor” of traditional philosophy of
science) and Kantian backing, or what might be called “retranscendental-
ization”. We must not forget that, even when dealing with “local” issues of
the identiability of objects within practices and the roles that our practices
and/or paradigms (may) play in the constitution of reality as knowable and
representable by us we are dealing with transcendental topics. Philosophy of
science does not, and must not, give up those fundamental traditional con-
cerns simply by turning pragmatic and non-foundationalist; through that
turn it merely reinterprets them in novel ways.
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